Of God and His Creatures 83That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will

CHAPTER LXXXVII -- That nothing can be a Cause to the Divine Will

THOUGH some reason may be assigned for the divine will, yet it does not follow that there is any cause of that will's volition. For the cause of volition is the end in view: now the end in view of the divine will is its own goodness: that then is God's cause of willing, which is also His own act of willing. But of other objects willed by God none is to God a cause of willing, but one of them is cause to another of its being referred to the divine goodness, and thus God is understood to will one for the sake of another. But clearly we must suppose no passing from point to point of God's will, where there is only one act, as shown above of the divine intellect (Chap. LVII ). For God by one act wills His own goodness and all other things, as His action is His essence.

By this and the previous chapter the error is excluded of some who say that all things proceed from God by sheer will, so that no reason is to be rendered of anything that He does beyond the fact that God so wills. Which position is even contrary to divine Scripture, which tells us that God has done all things according to the order of His wisdom: Thou hast done all things in wisdom ( Ps. ciii, 24 ); and God has shed wisdom over all his works ( Ecclus i, 10 ).